Dynamic pricing and learning with finite inventories by Boer, Arnoud den & Zwart, Bert
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
e
m
o
r
a
n
du
m 
20
29
 (
De
ce
mb
er
 2
01
3)
. 
IS
SN
 1
87
4−
48
50
. 
Av
ai
la
bl
e 
fr
om
: 
ht
tp
:/
/w
ww
.m
at
h.
ut
we
nt
e.
nl
/p
ub
li
ca
ti
on
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f 
Ap
pl
ie
d 
Ma
th
em
at
ic
s,
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
of
 T
we
nt
e,
 E
ns
ch
ed
e,
 T
he
 N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories
Arnoud den Boer1, Bert Zwart2,3
1University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede
2Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), Science Park 123, 1098 XG Amsterdam
3VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081a, 1081 HV Amsterdam
July 7, 2013
Abstract
We study a dynamic pricing problem with finite inventory and parametric uncertainty
on the demand distribution. Products are sold during selling seasons of finite length, and
inventory that is unsold at the end of a selling season, perishes. The goal of the seller is to
determine a pricing strategy that maximizes the expected revenue. Inference on the unknown
parameters is made by maximum likelihood estimation. We propose a pricing strategy for
this problem, and show that the Regret - which is the expected revenue loss due to not using
the optimal prices - after T selling seasons is O(log2(T )). Apart from a small modification,
our pricing strategy is a certainty equivalent pricing strategy, which means that at each
moment, the price is chosen that is optimal w.r.t. the current parameter estimates. The good
performance of our strategy is caused by an endogenous-learning property: using a pricing
policy that is optimal w.r.t. a certain parameter sufficiently close to the optimal one, leads to
a.s. convergence of the parameter estimates to the true, unknown parameter. We also show
an instance in which the regret for all pricing policies grows as log(T ). This shows that our
upper bound on the growth rate of the regret is close to the best achievable growth rate.
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction, Motivation, Literature
The emergence of Internet as a sales channel has made it very easy for companies to experiment
with selling prices. Where in the past costs and effort were needed to change prices, for example
by issuing a new catalogue or replacing price tags, and consequently prices where fixed for longer
periods of time, nowadays a webshop can adapt their prices with a proverbial flick of the switch,
without any additional costs or efforts. This flexibility in pricing is one of the main drivers for
research on dynamic pricing : the study of determining optimal selling prices under changing
circumstances.
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A much-studied situation is a firm who sells limited amounts of products during finite selling
periods, after which all unsold products perish. Examples of products with this property are flight
tickets, hotel rooms, car rental reservations, and concert tickets. Various dynamic pricing models
are already applied in these branches (see Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). Other products that
fall in this framework but for which dynamic pricing is not (yet) commonplace, are newspapers,
magazines, and food at a grocery store. The emergence of digital price tags however may change
this in the near future, see Kalyanam et al. (2006).
An important insight from the literature on dynamic pricing is that the optimal selling price of
these type of products depends on the remaining inventory and the length of the remaining selling
period, see e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). The optimal decision is thus not to use a single
price but a collection of prices: one for each combination of remaining inventory and remaining
length of the selling period. To determine these optimal prices it is essential to know the relation
between the demand and the selling price. In most literature from the nineties on dynamic pricing,
it is assumed that this relation is exactly known to the seller, but in practice exact information
on consumer behavior is generally not available. It is therefore not surprising that the review on
dynamic pricing by Bitran and Caldentey (2003) mentions dynamic pricing with demand learning
as an important future research direction. The presence of digital sales data enables a data-driven
approach of dynamic pricing, where the selling firm not only determines optimal prices, but also
learns how changing prices affects the demand. Ideally, this learning will eventually lead to optimal
pricing decisions.
Since then, a considerable number of studies on this subject have appeared, most of which are
reviewed in Araman and Caldentey (2011). We also mention the related studies by Kleinberg and
Leighton (2003), Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), den Boer and Zwart (2010), Harrison et al.
(2012), who consider dynamic pricing in a slightly different setting, namely with infinite inventory.
This significantly changes the structure of the learning behavior, as further discussed in Section 4.
A common feature of the studies on dynamic pricing with finite inventory is the restriction to a
single selling season during which learning and optimization takes place. To assess the performance
of proposed pricing strategies, one often considers an asymptotic regime where the demand rate
and the initial amount of inventory grow to infinity (e.g. Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, Wang et al.,
2011). Such an asymptotic regime may have practical value if demand, initial inventory, and the
length of the selling season are relatively large. In many situations, however, this is not the case.
For example, in the hotel rooms industry (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004, section 10.2, Weatherford
and Kimes, 2003), a product may be modeled as a combination of arrival date and length-of-
stay. Different products may have different, overlapping selling periods, and similar demand
characteristics. It would therefore be unwise to learn the consumer behavior for each product and
selling period separately. In addition, the average demand, initial capacity and length of a selling
period may be quite low, which makes this particular asymptotic regime not a suitable setting to
study the performance of pricing strategies.
These considerations motivate the present study dynamic pricing of perishable products with finite
initial inventory, during multiple consecutive selling seasons of finite and fixed duration.
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1.2 Contributions
We consider a parametric demand model which includes practically all demand function that are
used in practice. The uncertainty in the demand is modeled by unknown parameters, which can
be estimated from historical sales data using maximum quasi-likelihood estimation.
We propose a pricing strategy that is structurally very intuitive, and easy to understand by price
managers. At every moment where prices can be changed, the firm calculates a statistical estimate
of the unknown parameter. Subsequently, the price is determined that would be optimal if this
parameter estimate were correct, and this price is used until the next decision moment. In other
words, at each decision moment the firm acts as if being certain about the parameter estimates.
Only in the last period of a selling season for which inventory is still positive, a small deviation
on this price may be prescribed by our pricing strategy.
This type of strategy for sequential decision problems under uncertainty is known under different
names in the literature: certainty equivalent control, myopic control, passive learning, and the
principle of estimation and control. There are problems for which certainty equivalent control is
not a good strategy, e.g. the multi-period control problem (Anderson and Taylor, 1976, Lai and
Robbins, 1982), and dynamic pricing with infinite inventory (Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012,
Harrison et al., 2011, den Boer and Zwart, 2010). In these two examples, passive learning is not
sufficient to learn the parameters: the decision maker should actively account for the fact that
he is not only optimizing prices, but also tries to ’optimize’ the learning process. This implies
that sometimes decisions should be taken that seem suboptimal on a short term. In the dynamic
pricing problem with infinite inventory, this can be accomplished by the controlled variance policy
of den Boer and Zwart (2010) or the MLE-cycle policy of Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012).
The infinite-inventory setting is also closely related to several problems from the online convex-
optimization, multi-armed bandit and stochastic approximation literature; see den Boer and Zwart
(2010) for references and a brief discussion on similarities and differences with dynamic pricing.
In the situation that we study in this article, dynamic pricing with finite inventory and finite
selling periods, certainty equivalent control does perform well: the parameter estimates converge
with probability one to the correct values, and the prices converge to the optimal prices. The
Regret(T ), which measures the expected amount of revenue loss in the first T selling seasons
due to not using the optimal prices, is O(log2(T )). This bound is considerably better than
√
T ,
which is the best achievable growth rate of the regret for the problem with infinite inventory (in
different settings, this is shown by Kleinberg and Leighton (2003), Besbes and Zeevi (2011), Broder
and Rusmevichientong (2012)), and moreover, this bound can hardly be improved. We show an
instance for which any pricing strategy has Regret(T ) ≥ K log(T ), for some K independent of T
and of the pricing strategy. This means that the upper bound log2(T ) on the regret is close to
the best achievable growth rate log(T ). In Section 7.3 we discuss the small gap between the lower
and upper bound.
Thus, the regret, which can be interpreted as the ’cost for learning’, behaves structurally different in
these two models. This difference in qualitative behavior can be explained as follows. In the infinite
inventory model, prices and parameter estimates can get stuck in what Harrison et al. (2012) call
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an ’indeterminate equilibrium’. This means that for some values of the parameter estimates,
the expected observed demand at the certainty equivalent price is equal to what the parameter
estimates predict; in other words, the observations confirm the correctness of the (incorrect)
parameter estimates. As a result, certainty equivalent control induces insufficient dispersion in
the chosen selling prices to eventually learn the true value of the parameters.
Such cannot occur in the setting with finite inventories and finite selling seasons. An optimal price
- optimal w.r.t. certain parameter estimates - is namely not a fixed number, but changes depending
on the remaining inventory and the remaining length of the selling season. Thus, an optimal policy
naturally induces endogenous price dispersion, and prices cannot get stuck in an ’indeterminate
equilibrium’. On the contrary, the large amount of price dispersion implies that the unknown
parameters are learned quite fast, and consequently that the Regret(T ) is only O(log2(T )).
The main conceptual takeaway of our paper is that, in decision problems under uncertainty, a
passive-learning strategy works well if it induces sufficient dispersion in the controls. We show this
for a specific dynamic-pricing problem, but, as we argue in Section 7.2, the idea is also applicable
in other decision problems. Our work complements two streams of literature on dynamic-pricing-
and-learning. First, in the infinite-capacity setting (Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Broder and
Rusmevichientong, 2012, Harrison et al., 2011, den Boer and Zwart, 2010) it is known that active
price experimentation is necessary to achieve optimal regret; myopic policies have suboptimal
performance. In our finite-capacity setting, changes in the marginal-value-of-inventory causes
endogenous price dispersion, which makes sure that learning the unknown parameters ”takes care
of itself”, and which leads to a qualitatively much better performance than what is possible in the
infinite-capacity setting. Second, in the finite-capacity setting where demand and inventory level
grow to infinity (Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, Wang et al., 2011), active price experimentation is also
known to be necessary to achieve optimal performance. The reason is that, in this asymptotic
regime, the amount of price dispersion induced by the myopic policy decreases to zero. We consider
a different asymptotic regime in which changes in the marginal-value-of-inventory keeps inducing
price dispersion in the asymptotic regime; as a result, no active price experimentation is necessary,
and the myopic strategy performs very well.
Our work is also connected to the field of adaptive control in Markov decision problems (Herna´ndez-
Lerma, 1989, Kumar, 1985, chapter 12 of Kumar and Varaiya, 1986). An important feature that
distinguishes our work from many previous literature in this area, is the following. Herna´ndez-
Lerma and Cavazos-Cadena (1990), Gordienko and Minja´rez-Sosa (1998) assume that the “next”
state xt+1 at period t+1 is determined by the “current” state xt, action at, and a random compo-
nent ξt. These random components are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. In
our setting, the randomness in state transitions is completely determined by the demand realiza-
tions. These are neither identically distributed (their distribution depends on the chosen prices),
nor independent (chosen prices may depend on all previously chosen prices and observed demand
realizations, and, consequentially, demand in different time periods is not independent). In other
literature, such as Altman and Shwartz (1991), unknown transition probabilities are estimated
by the empirically observed relative frequencies. In our setting, all uncertainty is captured by an
unknown parameter, and transition probabilities are estimated simultaneously. Furthermore, we
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consider a compact continuous action space, in contrast to e.g. Burnetas and Katehakis (1997),
Chang et al. (2005) who assume a finite action space, which links the adaptive control problem to
the multi-armed bandit problem.
Summarizing, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) We formulate the problem of dynamic pricing with finite inventories during multiple, consec-
utive selling seasons of finite duration, with parametric uncertainty in the demand function.
(ii) We propose a simple and intuitive pricing strategy, based on the idea of subsequently esti-
mating the unknown parameters and choosing the selling price that would be optimal if this
parameter estimate were correct.
(iii) We show that the problem satisfies an endogenous-learning property, which means that the
use of policies that are optimal w.r.t. parameter estimates automatically induces a certain
amount of price dispersion.
(iv) We prove that this leads to convergence of the parameter estimates to the true value, and
we show Regret(T ) = O(log2(T )).
(v) We provide an instance for which any pricing strategy has Regret(T ) that grows at least
logarithmically in T , implying that the O(log2(T )) upper bound on the regret is close to the
best achievable growth rate.
(vi) We provide numerical examples to illustrate our results, and discuss various extensions of
our model.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mathematical model, the
structure of the demand distribution, the full-information optimal solution, and the regret measure.
Section 3 shows how the unknown parameters of the model can be estimated, and contains a result
concerning the speed at which parameter estimates converge to the true value. The endogenous-
learning property of the system is described in Section 4. Our pricing strategy is introduced in
Section 5.1, the upper bound Regret(T ) = O(log2(T )) is shown in Section 5.2, and the log(T )
lower bound in Section 5.3. Numerical illustrations of the pricing strategy and its performance are
provided in Section 6. A discussion of the results and possible extensions of this paper is provided
in Section 7. The mathematical proofs of the main results in this paper are contained in Section
8. A number of auxiliary results are formulated and proven in Section 9.
Notation The interior of a set U ⊂ Rn is denoted by int(U). If v is a vector then ||v|| denotes
the Euclidean norm, and vT the transpose. If A is an m× n matrix, ||A|| = maxx∈Rn,||x||=1 ||Ax||
denotes the induced matrix norm of A, and λmin(A) denotes the smallest eigenvalue of A. For
x ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer which is smaller than or equal to x.
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2 Model Primitives
In this section we subsequently introduce the model, describe the characteristics of the demand
distribution, discuss the optimal pricing policy under full information, and introduce the regret as
quality measure of pricing policies.
2.1 Model Formulation
We consider a monopolist seller of perishable products which are sold during consecutive selling
seasons. Each selling season consists of S ∈ N discrete time periods: the i-th selling season starts
at time period 1+(i−1)S, and lasts until period iS, for all i ∈ N. We write SSt = 1+ ⌊(t−1)/S⌋
to denote the selling season corresponding to period t, and st = t − (SSt − 1)S to denote the
relative time in the selling period. At the start of each selling season the seller has C ∈ N discrete
units of inventory at his disposal, which can only be sold during that particular selling season. At
the end of a selling season, all unsold inventory perishes.
In each time period t ∈ N the seller has to determine a selling price pt ∈ [pl, ph]. Here 0 < pl < ph
denote the lowest and highest price admissible to the firm. After setting the price the seller
observes a realization of demand, which takes values in {0, 1}, and collects revenue. We let ct,
(t ∈ N), denote the capacity or inventory level at the beginning of period t ∈ N, and dt the demand
in period t. The dynamics of (ct)t∈N are given by
ct = C, if st = 1,
ct = max{ct−1 − dt−1, 0}, if st ̸= 1.
The pricing decisions of the seller are allowed to depend on previous prices and demand realizations,
but not on future ones. More precisely, for each t ∈ N we define the set of possible histories Ht as
Ht = {(p1, . . . , pt, d1, . . . , dt) ∈ [pl, ph]t × {0, 1}t},
withH0 = {∅}. A pricing strategy ψ = (ψt)t∈N is a collection of functions ψt : Ht−1 → [pl, ph], such
that p1 = ψ1(∅), and for each t ≥ 2 the seller chooses the price pt = ψt(p1, . . . , pt−1, d1, . . . , dt−1).
The revenue collected in period t equals ptmin{ct, dt}. The purpose of the seller is to find a
pricing strategy ψ that maximizes the cumulative expected revenue earned after T selling seasons,∑TS
i=1Eψ[pimin{di, ci}]. Here we write Eψ to emphasize that this expectation depends on the
pricing strategy ψ.
2.2 Demand Distribution
The demand in a single time period against selling price p is a realization of the random variable
D(p). We assume that D(p) is Bernoulli distributed with mean E[D(p)] = h(β0 + β1p), for all
p ∈ [pl, ph], some (β0, β1) ∈ R2, and some function h. The true value of β is denoted by β(0), and
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is unknown to the seller. Conditionally on selling prices, the demand in any two different time
periods are independent.
To ensure existence and uniqueness of revenue-maximizing selling prices, we make a number of
assumptions on h and β. First, we assume that β(0) lies in the interior of a compact set B ⊂ R2
known to the seller, and assume that β1 < 0 for all β ∈ B. Second, we assume that h is three
times continuously differentiable, log-concave, h(β0 + β1p) ∈ (0, 1) for all β ∈ B and p ∈ [pl, ph],
and the derivative h˙(z) of h(z) is strictly positive. This last assumption, together with β1 < 0 for
all β ∈ B, implies that expected demand is decreasing in p, for all β ∈ B.
Write r∗ = maxp∈[pl,ph] p · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p), and for (a, β, p) ∈ R×B × [pl, ph], define
ga,β(p) = −(p− a)β1 h˙(β0 + β1p)
h(β0 + β1p)
.
We assume that ga,β(0)(pl) < 1, ga,β(0)(ph) > 1, and ga,β(0)(p) is strictly increasing in p, for all
0 ≤ a ≤ r∗. These conditions, which for a = 0 coincide with the assumptions in Lariviere (2006,
page 602), ensure that the function which maps p to (p−a)h(β(0)0 +β(0)1 p) has a unique maximizer
in (pl, ph).
Practically all demand functions that are used in practice fit into our framework. Some examples
(with appropriate conditions on B and [pl, ph]) are h(z) = exp(z), h(z) = z, and h(z) = logit(z) =
exp(z)/(1 + exp(z)).
2.3 Full-information Optimal Solution
If the value of β is known, the optimal prices can be determined by solving a Markov decision
problem (MDP). Since each selling season corresponds to the same MDP, the optimal pricing
strategy for multiple selling seasons is to repeatedly use the optimal policy for a single selling
season. The state space of this MDP is X = {(c, s) | c = 0, . . . , C, s = 1, . . . , S}, where (c, s)
means that there are c units of remaining inventory at the beginning of the s-th period of the
selling season, and the action space is the interval [pl, ph]. If action p is used in state (c, s), s < S,
then with probability h(β0 + β1p) a state transition (c, s) → ((c − 1)+, s + 1) occurs and reward
ph(β0+β1p)1c>0 is obtained; with probability 1−h(β0+β1p) a state transition (c, s)→ (c, s+1)
occurs and zero reward is obtained. If action p is used in state (c, S), then with probability
one a state transition (c, s) 7→ (C, 1) occurs; the obtained reward equals ph(β0 + β1p)1c>0 with
probability h(β0 + β1p), and zero with probability 1− h(β0 + β1p).
A (stationary deterministic) policy π is a matrix (π(c, s))0≤c≤C,1≤s≤S in the policy space Π =
[pl, ph]
(C+1)×S . Given a policy π ∈ Π, let V piβ (c, s) be the expected revenue-to-go function starting
in state (c, s) ∈ X and using the actions of π. Then V piβ (c, s) satisfies the following recursion:
V piβ (c, s) = (1− h(β0 + β1π(c, s))) · V piβ (c, s+ 1)
+ h(β0 + β1π(c, s)) · (π(c, s) + V piβ (c− 1, s+ 1)), (1 ≤ c ≤ C), (1)
V piβ (0, s) = 0, (2)
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for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S, where we write V piβ (c, S + 1) = 0 for all 0 ≤ c ≤ C.
By Proposition 4.4.3 of Puterman (1994), for each β ∈ B there is a corresponding optimal policy
π∗β ∈ Π. This policy can be calculated using backward induction. Write Vβ(c, s) = V
pi∗β
β (c, s) for
the optimal revenue-to-go function. Then Vβ(c, s) and π
∗
β(c, s), for 1 ≤ c ≤ C, 1 ≤ s ≤ S, satisfy
the following recursion:
Vβ(c, s) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
[
p−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1)
]
h(β0 + β1p) + Vβ(c, s+ 1),
π∗β(c, s) ∈ arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
[
p−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1)
]
h(β0 + β1p),
(3)
where we define ∆Vβ(c, s) = Vβ(c, s)−Vβ(c−1, s), and ∆Vβ(0, s) = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S. The price
π∗β(0, s) can be chosen arbitrarily, since it has no effect on the reward.
The optimal average reward of the MDP is equal to Vβ(C, 1), and the true optimal average reward
is equal to Vβ(0)(C, 1).
2.4 Regret Measure
The quality of the pricing decisions of the seller are measured by the regret: the expected amount
of money lost due to not using optimal prices. The regret of pricing strategy ψ after the first T
selling seasons is defined as
Regret(ψ, T ) = T · Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
TS∑
i=1
E[pimin{di, ci}], (4)
where (pi)i∈N denote the prices generated by the pricing strategy ψ.
Maximizing the cumulative expected revenue is equivalent to minimizing the regret, but observe
that the regret cannot directly be used by the seller to find the optimal strategy, since it depends
on the unknown β(0). Also note that we calculate the regret over a number of selling seasons, and
not over a number of time periods. The reason is that the optimal policy π∗
β(0)
is optimized over
an entire selling season, and not over each individual state of the underlying MDP: a price pt may
induce a higher instant reward in a certain state (ct, st) than the optimal price π
∗
β(0)
(ct, st). This
effect is averaged out by looking at the optimal expected reward in an entire selling season.
For small T the optimal policy under incomplete information can in theory be calculated exactly,
by solving a MDP with state-space that includes all possible demand realizations. This MDP
however is computationally intractable for even moderate values of T . It is therefore common in
the literature on dynamic pricing to study the asymptotic growth rate of Regret(T ) as T grows
large, and search for pricing strategies that have the lowest possible growth rate on the regret.
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3 Parameter Estimation
3.1 Maximum-likelihood Estimation
The value of β(0) can be estimated with maximum-likelihood estimation. In particular, given a
sample of prices p1, . . . , pt and demand realizations d1, . . . dt, the log-likelihood function Lt(β)
equals
Lt(β) =
t∑
i=1
log
[
h(β0 + β1pi)
di(1− h(β0 + β1pi))1−di
]
.
The score function, the derivative of Lt(β) with respect to β, equals
lt(β) =
t∑
i=1
h˙(β0 + β1pi)
h(β0 + β1pi)(1− h(β0 + β1pi))
(
1
pi
)
(di − h(β0 + β1pi)). (5)
We let βˆt be a solution to lt(β) = 0. If no solution exists, we define βˆt = β
(1), for some predefined
β(1) ∈ B. If a solution to lt(β) = 0 exists but lies outside B, we define βˆt as the projection of this
solution on B. For most choices of h there is no explicit formula for the solution of lt(β) = 0, and
numerical methods have to be deployed to calculate it.
3.2 Convergence Rates of Parameter Estimates
Understanding the asymptotic behavior of the maximum quasi-likelihood estimate βˆt, in particular
the speed at which it converges to β(0), is important to study the performance of pricing strategies.
We here quote a result from den Boer and Zwart (2011) about these convergence rates; in Section
5.2, this result is used to prove bounds on the regret of a pricing strategy.
The speed at which the estimates converge to β(0) turns out to be closely related to a certain
measure of price dispersion: the more price dispersion, the faster the parameters converge. In
particular, if we define the matrix
Pt =
(
t
∑t
i=1 pi∑t
i=1 pi
∑t
i=1 p
2
i
)
, (t ∈ N), (6)
then λmin(Pt), the smallest eigenvalue of Pt, turns out to be a suitable measure for the amount of
price dispersion in a sample.
The following proposition shows how λmin(Pt) influences the convergence speed of the parameter
estimates. To state the result, we define the last-time random variable
Tρ = sup
{
t ∈ N | there is no β ∈ B with
∣∣∣∣∣∣β − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρ and lt(β) = 0} , (7)
for ρ > 0.
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Proposition 1. Suppose L is a non-random function on N such that λmin(Pt) ≥ L(t) > 0 a.s.,
for all t ≥ t0 and some non-random t0 ∈ N, and such that inft≥t0 L(t)t−α > 0, for some α > 1/2.
Then there exists a ρ1 > 0 such that for all 0 < ρ ≤ ρ1 we have Tρ <∞ a.s., E [Tρ] <∞, and
E
[
||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ
]
= O (log(t)/L(t)) .
This proposition follows directly from Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Remark 2 in den Boer and
Zwart (2011).
4 Main Result: a Case of Endogenous Learning
Proposition 1 shows how the growth rate of λmin(Pt) influences the speed at which the parameter
estimates converge to the true value. The main result of this section is that λmin(Pt) strictly
increases if, during a selling season, prices are used that are close to that prescribed by π∗
β(0)
. This
means that a continuous use of prices close to π∗
β(0)
leads to a linear growth rate of λmin(Pt), which
by Proposition 1 implies that the parameter estimates converges very fast to the true value, in
particular with rate E
[
||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ
]
= O (log(t)/t).
This result can be interpreted as the system having an endogenous-learning property: the unknown
parameters are learned very fast when a policy close to the optimal policy is used. This is the
main takeaway of this paper. In Section 5.2 this property will be exploited to prove upper bounds
on our proposed pricing strategy.
Theorem 1. Let 1 < C < S and k ∈ N. There exist a constant v0 > 0, and an open neighborhood
U ⊂ B containing β(0), such that, if
ps+(k−1)S = π
∗
β(s)(cs+(k−1)S , s)
for all s = 1, . . . , S and some sequence β(1), . . . , β(S) ∈ U , then
min
1≤s,s′≤S
|ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S | ≥ v0/2. (8)
and
λmin(PkS)− λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥ 1
8
v20(1 + p
2
h)
−1, (9)
The condition 1 < C < S in Theorem 1 makes sure that price dispersion occurs during a selling
season. If C = 1 then the firm may go out-of-stock in the first period of the selling season, which
implies that only a single price is charged during that selling season and thus no price dispersion
occurs. The C ≥ S case can be interpreted as that C−S items cannot be sold at all, and that each
of the remaining S items can only be sold in a single, dedicated time period. As a result, there
is no interaction between individual items, and the pricing problem is equivalent to S repetitions
of the pricing problem with C = 1, S = 1, which means that no price dispersion occurs. Phrased
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differently: if C ≥ S then the marginal-value-of-inventory remains constant throughout the selling
season, and thus the optimal price is constant as well. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012), den
Boer and Zwart (2010), Harrison et al. (2012) consider pricing strategies for this case, and show
that the lack of endogenous learning means that active price experimentation is necessary to learn
the unknown parameters. For 1 < C < S, Section 7.4 discusses in more detail the effect of C and
S on the amount of price dispersion.
In Remark 1, stated directly after the proof of Theorem 1, we compute an explicit, positive lower
bound on v0.
The proof of Theorem 1 makes use of a number of auxiliary lemmas, which are formulated and
proven in Section 9.
5 Pricing Strategy and Performance Bounds
5.1 Pricing Strategy
We propose a pricing strategy based on the following principle: in each period, estimate the
unknown parameters, and subsequently use the action from the policy that is optimal with respect
to this estimate.
Pricing strategy Φ(ϵ)
Initialization: Choose 0 < ϵ < (ph − pl)/4, and initial prices p1, p2 ∈ [pl, ph], with p1 ̸= p2.
For all t ≥ 2: if ct+1 = 0, set pt+1 ∈ [pl, ph] arbitrary. If ct+1 > 0:
Estimation: Determine βˆt, and let pceqp = π
∗
βˆt
(ct+1, st+1).
Pricing:
I) If
(a) |pi − pj | < ϵ for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ t with SSi = SSt+1, and
(b) |pi − pceqp| < ϵ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t with SSi = SSt+1, and
(c) ct+1 = 1 or st+1 = S,
then choose pt+1 ∈
({pceqp + 2ϵ, pceqp − 2ϵ} ∩ [pl, ph]).
II) Else, set pt+1 = pceqp.
Given a positive inventory level, the pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) sets the price pt+1 equal to the price
that is optimal according to the available parameter estimates βˆt, except possibly when the state
(ct+1, st+1) is in the set {(c, s) | c = 1 or s = S}. This set contains all states that, with positive
probability, are the last states in the selling season in which products are sold (either because
the selling season almost finishes, or because the inventory consists of only a single product).
In these states, the price pt+1 deviates from the certainty equivalent price pceqp if otherwise
11
max{|pi − pj | | SSi = SSt+1} < ϵ. This deviation ensures that also for small t, when βˆt may be
far away from the true value β(0), a minimum amount of price dispersion is guaranteed.
5.2 Upper Bound on the Regret
The endogenous-learning property described in Section 4 implies that if βˆt is sufficiently close
to β(0) and ϵ is sufficiently small, then I) does not occur. As βˆt converges to β
(0), the pricing
strategy Φ(ϵ) eventually acts as a certainty equivalent pricing strategy. The pricing decisions in
II) are driven by optimizing instant revenue, and do not reckon with the objective of optimizing
the quality of the parameter estimates βˆt. The endogenous-learning property makes sure that
learning the parameter values happens on the fly, without active effort.
As a result, the parameter estimates converge quickly to their true values, and the pricing decisions
quickly to the optimal pricing decisions. The following theorem shows that the regret of the
strategy Φ(ϵ) is O(log2(T )) in the number of selling seasons T .
Theorem 2. Let 1 < C < S, v0 as in Theorem 1, and ϵ < v0/2. Then
Regret(Φ(ϵ), T ) = O(log2(T )).
To prove Theorem 2, we construct a Markov decision problem with a state-space that consists of
all sequences of possible demand realizations in a selling season. This ensures that, conditional
on all prices and demand realizations before a selling season, Φ(ϵ) corresponds to a stationary
deterministic policy, where each state of the state-space is associated with a unique price prescribed
by Φ(ϵ). We subsequently prove several sensitivity results that enable us to quantify the effect
of estimation errors
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆt − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ on the regret. The endogenous-learning property of Theorem 1,
combined with the ”small t correction” in I) of the description of Φ(ϵ), implies that λmin(Pt) grows
linearly in t. Using Proposition 1 this enables us to prove the O(log2(T )) bound on the regret.
In Remark 1, stated directly after the proof of Theorem 1, we compute an explicit, positive lower
bound on v0.
5.3 Lower Bound on the Regret
In this section we complement the O(log2(T )) upper bound of Theorem 2 by a lower bound on the
regret. In particular, we show an instance for which any pricing strategy has regret that grows
logarithmically in T . This shows that the asymptotic growth rate of regret of Φ(ϵ) is close to the
best achievable asymptotic growth rate.
Theorem 3. Let C = 1, S = 2, h the identity function, [pl, ph] = [3/8, 17/16], and let B =
[5/8, 6/8]× [−3/4,−9/16]. Then, for all pricing strategies ψ and all T ∈ N, we have
sup
β∈B
Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ 9245
25600(80 + 64π2)
log(T ).
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The theorem is proven by applying a generalization of the van Trees inequality, (Gill and Levit,
1995), along the same lines of (Lemma 4.6 Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012). Note that the
goal of the theorem is not to provide the best constant before the log(T ) term, but to show the
qualitative result that there is no pricing strategy with Regret(T ) = o(log(T )).
6 Numerical Illustration
To illustrate the analytical results that we have derived, we provide a number of numerical il-
lustrations. We first offer a simple instance that illustrate strong consistency of the parameter
estimates and convergence of the relative regret to zero. We also briefly consider the ’gap’ between
the upper bound O(log2(T )) of Theorem 2 and the lower bound of Theorem 3. We subsequently
look at an instance where we vary the level of initial inventory C, and look at the effect on the
regret. In the last illustration we fix C but vary S, to look at the effect of the length of the selling
season on the regret.
A. Basic example
As a first example, we consider an instance with C = 10, S = 20, pl = 1, ph = 20, β
(0)
0 = 2,
β
(0)
1 = −0.4, and h(z) = logit(z). The optimal expected revenue per selling season, Vβ(0)(C, 1), is
equal to 47.8. We consider a time span of 100 selling periods, and run 100 simulations.
Figure 1 shows the simulation average of the regret after each selling season, and of the relative
regret defined by
Relative regret(n) =
Regret(n)
n · Vβ(0)(C, 1))
× 100%.
To show some light on the growth rate of the regret, we scale in Figure 2 the regret by a log(n)
and a log2(n) factor. Theorem 2 entails that Regret(n)/ log2(n) is bounded, which accords with
the righthand plot in Figure 2. However, Theorem 3 suggests that the O(log2(n)) bound may
be too conservative, and that in fact the regret may grow logarithmically (cf. the discussion in
Section 7.3). The lefthand plot of Figure 2 shows the regret scaled by a log-factor. This picture
does not strongly support the assertion that Regret(n)/ log(n) is bounded, but this may be caused
by finite-horizon effects. Our numerical simulation thus does not give a conclusive answer on
the question whether this ’gap’ really exists in practice, or merely is a consequence of used proof
techniques. Different choices for β(0) show a similar picture.
B. Different levels of initial inventory
In our second numerical example we illustrate the effect of initial inventory on the regret. We
consider the same instance as in example A., but take S = 10 and C ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 9}, and run
100 simulations for each value of C. Table 1 shows for each C the optimal revenue per selling
season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and the estimation error at
the end of the time horizon.
The fourth column of Table 1 suggests that the relative regret is not monotone in C, but is minimal
13
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Figure 1: Simulation average of regret and relative regret
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Figure 2: Simulation average of regret, scaled by log(n) and log2(n).
Table 1: Simulation output for various choices of C
C Vβ(0)(C, 1) Regret(100) Relative regret(100)
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆ1000 − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 8.00 37.01 4.63 % 0.517
2 13.79 49.38 3.58 % 0.478
3 18.06 73.59 4.07 % 0.522
4 21.10 109.0 5.16 % 0.566
5 23.10 199.5 8.64 % 0.753
6 24.24 308.7 12.7 % 1.08
7 24.78 352.5 14.2 % 1.20
8 24.96 395.5 15.9 % 1.33
9 25.00 392.2 15.7 % 1.32
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for some C strictly between 1 and S. This can intuitively be explained as follows. For larger values
of C, the fraction of time that the firm is out-of-stock is small; this means that estimates are based
on more data, which generally increases the quality of the parameter estimates. However, if C
gets close to S then the amount of price dispersion induced by the myopic policy decreases:
for a substantial portion of a selling season there is hardly any variation in the marginal-value-
of-inventory, and as result the optimal price for different states (c, s) in the state-space of the
underlying MDP does not vary much. This behavior is reflected in the average estimation error
at the end of the time horizon, shown in the fifth column of Table 1.
C. Different length of selling season
In our third numerical illustration we consider the same instance as in A. and B., but fix the
inventory level at C = 5, and vary the length of the selling season. We let S ∈ {6, 7, . . . , 14}, and
for each choice of S run 100 simulations. Table 2 shows for each S the optimal revenue per selling
season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and the estimation error at
the end of the time horizon.
Table 2: Simulation output for various choices of S
S Vβ(0)(C, 1) Regret(100) Relative regret(100)
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆ100S − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
6 14.94 243.7 16.3 % 1.246
7 17.25 256.8 14.9 % 1.216
8 19.38 247.6 12.8 % 1.091
9 21.33 231.9 10.9 % 0.946
10 23.10 207.5 8.98 % 0.780
11 24.70 156.0 6.31 % 0.635
12 26.17 120.6 4.61 % 0.529
13 27.51 119.0 4.33 % 0.500
14 28.74 106.2 3.70 % 0.442
The results from Table 2 show that the relative regret is decreasing in S. This is not surprising:
larger values of S means that there are not only more opportunities to sell products, but also more
opportunities to learn about customer behavior. This is reflected in the fifth column of the table,
which shows that the simulation average of the estimation error at the end of the time horizon is
decreasing in S.
7 Discussion
7.1 Extensions to Other Demand Models
To facilitate analysis we impose some assumptions on the demand function: it depends on only
two unknown parameters (β0, β1), and is of the form E[D(p)] = h(β0 + β1p). Conceptually our
results do not hinge on these assumptions, and may still hold if one considers a demand model
that involves more than two unknown parameters, or where demand depends on the stage in the
selling season.
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As an example, suppose that E[D(p)] = h(β0 + β1p + β2p
2 + . . . + βmp
m), for some m ∈ N and
unknown parameters (β0, . . . , βm). Similarly as in Section 2.3 one can define the optimal full-
information solution π∗β(c, s), with h(β0 + β1p) in all relevant equations replaced by h(β0 + β1p+
β2p
2 + . . .+ βmp
m). The design matrix (6) is then equal to the (m+ 1)× (m+ 1) matrix
Pt =
t∑
i=1
(1, pi, p
2
i , . . . , p
m
i )
T (1, pi, p
2
i , . . . , p
m
i ).
To prove an endogenous-learning property similar to Theorem 1, one should show that for all β
close to β(0), using the policy π∗β in selling season k implies λmin(PkS)− λmin(P(k−1)S) > ϵ, for all
k ∈ N and some ϵ > 0 independent of k and β. This means that the amount of price dispersion,
measured by the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix, strictly increases in each selling season,
and as a result, the maximum likelihood estimate of β converge a.s. to the true value.
For this particular demand model, the endogenous-learning property can be guaranteed if a.s.
m + 1 distinct prices p1, . . . , pm+1 are used during a selling season, under policy π
∗
β . (Compare
this to the proof of Theorem 1, where we show that at least two different prices occur a.s. during
a selling season). If this is the case, then
λmin(PSk)− λmin(PS(k−1)) ≥ λmin
(m+1∑
i=1
(1, pi, . . . , p
m
i )
T (1, pi, . . . , p
m
i )
)
≥det
(∑m+1
i=1 (1, pi, . . . , p
m
i )
T (1, pi, . . . , p
m
i )
)
tr
(∑m+1
i=1 (1, pi, . . . , p
m
i )
T (1, pi, . . . , pmi )
)m ≥
∏
1≤i<j≤m+1(pi − pj)2(
supp∈P
∑m
i=0 p
2i
)m > 0,
which implies the endogenous-learning property.
Another example is E[D(p, s)] = h(β0 + β1p + β2s). Here the demand explicitly depends on
the stage s of the selling season, which models changing demand during a selling season. Again,
similarly as in Section 2.3 one can define the optimal full-information solution π∗β(c, s) of the
pricing problem, with h(β0 + β1p) in all relevant equations replaced by h(β0 + β1p + β2s). The
design matrix (6) is equal to
Pt =
t∑
i=1


1
pi
si

 (1, pi, si).
To prove an endogenous-learning property similar to Theorem 1, one should show that, for β close
to β(0), using the policy π∗β in selling season k implies that λmin(PkS)− λmin(P(k−1)S > ϵ, for all
k ∈ N and some ϵ > 0 independent of β. This again implies strong consistency of the maximum
likelihood estimate of β.
In this demand model, a sufficient condition for the endogenous-learning property to hold is if
there are prices p1, p2, p3 used in stage s1, s2, s3, respectively, such that (p3(s2 − s1) + p2(s3 −
s1) + p1(s3 − s2))2 > 0. (This condition ensures that the vectors {(1, pi, si)T | i = 1, 2, 3} are
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linearly independent). If this holds, then
λmin(PSk)− λmin(PS(k−1)) ≥ λmin
( 3∑
i=1
(1, pi, si)
T (1, pi, si)
)
≥det
(∑3
i=1(1, pi, si)
T (1, pi, si)
)
tr
(∑3
i=1(1, pi, si)
T (1, pi, si)
)2 ≥ (p3(s2 − s1) + p2(s3 − s1) + p1(s3 − s2))2(3 + 3S2 + 3 supp∈P p2)2 > 0,
which implies the endogenous-learning property.
We believe that for these alternative demand models an endogenous-learning property can be
shown. Formally proving the needed price-dispersion conditions can however be somewhat tedious;
the proof of Theorem 1 for the simpler demand model E[D(p)] = h(β0 + β1p) is already quite
delicate. Numerical simulations show that many different prices are occur during a selling season,
and not only two different prices as guaranteed by Theorem 1. This suggest that the endogenous-
learning property may also holds in the two demand models discussed above. Formalizing this
property for these (and other) demand models is an interesting direction for future research.
7.2 Endogenous Learning in other Decision Problems
The endogenous-learning property shown in Theorem 1 is the key result that leads to consistency
of the myopic policy and to a regret that grows only O(log2(T )). This property seems not unique
for the pricing problem under consideration, but may be satisfied by many other decision problems
as well. We here briefly outline some types of problems for which this may be the case.
Consider a collection of discrete-time Markov decision problems (MDPs)
{(X,A, p(·, ·, ·, θ), r(·, ·, θ)) | θ ∈ Θ},
parameterized by a finite-dimensional parameter θ contained in some set Θ ⊂ Rd. For each θ ∈ Θ,
(X ,A, p(·, ·, ·, θ), r(·, ·, θ)) corresponds to an MDP with statespace X , action space A, transition
probabilities of going from state x to x′ when action a is used denoted by p(x, x′, a, θ), and the
expected reward of using action a in state x denoted by r(x, a, θ), for x, x′ ∈ X and a ∈ A.
(see Puterman (1994) for an introduction to MDPs). The goal of the decision maker may be to
optimize the average reward or discounted reward, over a finite or infinite time horizon, without
knowing the value of θ.
Suppose that each time that an action a is selected in state x, a realization yi of a random
variable Y is observed, the distribution of which depends on x, a, and θ. With an appropriate
statistical model of Y , the value of the unknown θ may at each decision moment be inferred
from the previously observed realizations, chosen actions, and visited stated, using an appropriate
statistical technique (maximum likelihood estimation, (non)-linear regression, Bayesian methods,
nonparametric methods). If θˆ denotes the estimated value of θ, then a myopic policy is to always
select the action that is optimal if θˆ equals the true but unknown θ.
Strong consistency of an estimator (a.s. convergence of θˆ to θ as the number of observations
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increase) typically presumes a minimum amount of variation/dispersion in the controls; see e.g.
Skouras (2000), Pronzato (2009) for nonlinear regression models, Chen et al. (1999) for generalized
linear models, the classic Lai and Wei (1982) for linear regression models, and Hu (1996, 1998) for
Bayesian regression models. The decision problems described above satisfy an endogenous-learning
property if the myopic policy induces an amount of dispersion in the controls that guarantees
strong consistency of the estimator. As a result, no active experimentation is then necessary to
eventually learn the unknown θ; learning ’takes care of itself’ by just simply using myopic actions.
This contrasts many other decision problems under uncertainty where deviating from the myopic
policy is necessary to eventually learn the unknown parameters of the system (e.g. in multi-armed
bandit problems).
7.3 Gap Between Lower and Upper Bound on the Regret
Theorem 2 shows that the regret of our pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) is O(log2(T )), and Theorem 3 shows
that the regret of any pricing strategy grows at least as log(T ). This ”gap” between log2(T ) and
log(T ) points to the question whether Theorem 2 can be strengthened to O(log T ).
This question turns out to be rather difficult to answer. The ”additional” log(T ) term is caused by
the log(t) term in the convergence rates E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆt − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1t>Tρ
]
= O(log(t)/L(t)) of Proposition 5.
This log(t) term can be traced back to Proposition 2 of den Boer and Zwart (2011), who extend the
a.s. convergence rates of least-squares linear-regression estimators obtained by Lai and Wei (1982)
to convergence rates in expectation. Nassiri-Toussi and Ren (1994) show that in some cases the
log(t) term is really present in the behavior of least-squares estimates, and thus cannot simply be
removed. On the other hand, if the design is non-random and the disturbance terms are normally
distributed, it can be shown that this log(t)-term in Proposition 2 of den Boer and Zwart (2011)
can be removed. It is not at all clear how to determine, for a particular adaptive design, whether
the log-term plays a role in the asymptotic behavior of linear regression estimates. Consequently,
it is very hard to determine whether the log-term in Theorem 2 is present in practice, or is merely
a result of the used proof techniques. For practical applications this issue is fortunately not very
important, as it is quite hard to determine from data if a functions grows like log(T ) or like log2(T ).
For a discussion on this topic in a related pricing-and-learning problem, we refer to Section 5.2 of
den Boer (2011).
7.4 Effect of C and S on Price Dispersion
The results from section 6, in particular example B, indicate that the ratio between C and S
influences the convergence speed of parameter estimates. Intuitively, the following happens: if
C/S is close to zero, then the seller is relatively often out-of-stock; as a result less historical data
is available to form estimates, which in general leads to larger estimation errors. If C/S is close to
(but strictly smaller than) one, then the myopic policy induces less price dispersion; as long as the
state (c, s) of the underlying MDP has c/(S − s) ”close to” one (we do not further quantify this
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statement here), the prices stay close to the price that is optimal for C = S, and do not generate
much price dispersion.
To gain some insight on the influence of C and S on the growth rate of λmin(Pt), we provide two
numerical illustrations.
In the first, we take pl = 1, ph = 100, β
(0)
0 = 2, β
(0)
1 = −0.4, h(z) = logit(z). We fix C = 10
and choose S ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500}. For a fair comparison, we let the number of selling
seasons n be equal to 1000/S; the total time horizon then consists of 1000 time periods, for each
experiment. For each choice of S, we perform 100 simulations and record the price dispersion
measured by λmin(Pt), for t = 1, . . . , 1000.
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Figure 3: Price dispersion, for different values of S and n
Figure 3 shows the simulation average of λmin(Pt) for t = 1, . . . , 1000, for the different values of
(S, n). For all experiments, λmin(Pt) grows linearly in t. The magnitude of the growth rate (i.e.
the slope of each graph in the figure) depends on the particular choice of S and n.
This magnitude effects the speed at which parameter estimates converge to the true value. Figure
4 shows for S ∈ {10, 20, 50, 1000} the simulation average of the estimation error
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆt − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣, where
βˆt is based on the available prices and demand realizations induced by the optimal policy. The
figure shows that the estimation error
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆt − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ converges quicker to zero if the price dispersion
λmin(Pt) grows at a faster rate. For the case S = 10 the parameter estimates do not converge to
the true value, and λmin(Pt) does not grow to infinity. This is the case with C = S, which means
that active price experimentation is necessary (see our comments following Theorem 1).
Table 3 lists the values of λmin(Pt) at t = 1000, the end of the time horizon. It shows that
the amount of price dispersion is not monotone in S: the largest growth rate is achieved at the
experiment with S = 50, n = 20; for S larger than 50 it is decreasing in S, and for S smaller than
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Figure 4: Estimation error
∣∣∣∣∣∣βˆt − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣, for different values of S and n
50 it is increasing in S. This is in accordance with the intuition outlined above, which says that
the price dispersion grows slowly if C/S is close to zero or close to one.
Table 3: Price dispersion, for different values of S and n
S n λmin(P1000)
10 100 0.000
20 50 11.43
50 20 13.31
100 10 8.629
200 5 5.891
500 2 3.370
1000 1 2.003
In our second numerical illustration, we look at a scaling of C and S. We take the same instance
as above (i.e. pl = 1, ph = 100, β
(0)
0 = 2, β
(0)
1 = −0.4, h(z) = logit(z)), and consider 100
experiments: the n-th experiment has S = 10n and C = 3n, for n = 1, 2, . . . , 100. For n → ∞,
this is the asymptotic regime considered in Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2011). Note
that C/S = 0.3 for all n; we thus exclude the case where C/S gets close to zero or to one. For
each experiment we run 1000 simulations, and record the price dispersion induced by the optimal
policy after a single selling season, i.e. λmin(PS), when the prices of the optimal policy are used.
Figure 5 shows the simulation average of λmin(PS) as function of n (on the left), and as function
of log(n) (on the right). It suggests that the amount of price dispersion, induced by the optimal
pricing policy in a single selling season, grows as log(n). This slow growth rate explains why, in
the asymptotic regime considered by Besbes and Zeevi (2009) and Wang et al. (2011), active price
experimentation is necessary, whereas in our setting a myopic policy works well.
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Figure 5: λmin(PS), for S = 10n, C = 3n
8 Proofs
In this section we prove the main theorems of the paper. The proofs frequently refer to a number
of auxiliary lemmas, which are formulated and proven in Section 9.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the k-th selling season, and write c(1) = c1+(k−1)S , c(2) = c2+(k−1)S , . . ., c(S) = ckS .
We show that there is a v0 > 0 such that if prices π
∗
β(0)
(c(s), s) are used in state (c(s), s), for
all s = 1, . . . , S, then there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S with |π∗
β(0)
(c(s), s) − π∗
β(0)
(c(s′), s′)| > v0. Since
π∗β is continuous in β around β
(0) (Lemma 3), this implies that there is an open neighborhood
U ⊂ UB around β(0) such that, if price π∗β(s)(c(s), s) is used in state (c(s), s), for all s = 1, . . . , S
and some sequence (β(1), . . . , β(S)) ∈ U , then there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S such that |π∗β(s)(c(s), s) −
π∗β(s′)(c(s
′), s′)| > v0/2. This proves (8). Equation (9) follows by application of Lemma 4.
Define
▹ = {(c, s) | S + 1− C ≤ s ≤ S, S + 1− s ≤ c ≤ C}. (10)
See Figure 6 for an illustration of ▹ in the state space X . Notice that since (C, 1) /∈ ▹ (by the
assumption C < S), the path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S may or may not hit ▹. We show that in both cases,
at least two different selling prices occur on the path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S .
Case 1. The path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S hits ▹. Then there is an s such that (c(s), s) ∈ ▹ and (c(s), s−1) /∈
▹. In particular, (c(s), s− 1) ∈ (L▹) = {(1, S − 1), (2, S − 2), . . . , (C − 1, S − C + 1), (C, S − C)},
where (L▹) denotes the points (c, s) immediately left to ▹ in Figure 6. We show that the sets ▹
and (L▹) satisfy the following properties:
(P.1) If (c, s) ∈ ▹ then ∆Vβ(0)(c, s+ 1) = 0, π∗β(0)(c, s) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
ph(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p), and
Vβ(0)(c, s) = (S − s+ 1) · Vβ(0)(1, S).
(P.2) If (c, s) ∈ (L▹), then π∗
β(0)
(c, s) ̸= π∗
β(0)
(c, s + 1) and ∆Vβ(0)(c + 1, S − c) ̸= 0 (provided
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Figure 6: Schematic picture of ▹
c < C). More precisely, ∆Vβ(0)(1, S) = f
∗
0,β(0)
and
∆Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c) = f∗0,β(0) − f∗∆V
β(0)
(c,S−c+1),β(0) > 0, (11)
for 1 < c < C, where f and p∗ are as in Lemma 2, and we shorthand write f∗
a,β(0)
=
fa,β(0)(p
∗
a,β(0)
).
Property (P.2) implies that a price change occurs when the path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S hits ▹. Property
(P.1) is used in the proof of property (P.2).
Proof of (P.1): Backward induction on s. If s = S and (c, s) ∈ ▹, then the assertions follow
immediately. Let s < S. Then ∆Vβ(0)(c, s + 1) = Vβ(0)(c, s + 1) − Vβ(0)(c − 1, s + 1) = 0,
π∗
β(0)
(c, s) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
ph(β
(0)
0 +β
(0)
1 p) and Vβ(0)(c, s) = maxp∈[pl,ph] ph(β
(0)
0 +β
(0)
1 p)+Vβ(0)(c, s+1) =
(S − s+ 1) · Vβ(0)(1, S), by (3) and the induction hypothesis. This proves (P.1).
Proof of (P.2). Induction on c. If c = 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L▹), then (c, s) = (1, S − 1). Since
∆Vβ(0)(1, S) = Vβ(0)(1, S) = f
∗
0,β(0)
> 0, Lemma 2 and equation (3) imply π∗
β(0)
(1, S − 1) ̸=
π∗
β(0)
(1, S). In addition,
Vβ(0)(2, S − 1) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
(p−∆Vβ(0)(2, S))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(2, S)
)
, (12)
Vβ(0)(1, S − 1) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
(p−∆Vβ(0)(1, S))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(1, S)
)
. (13)
Property (P.1) implies Vβ(0)(2, S) = Vβ(0)(1, S) and ∆Vβ(0)(2, S) = 0. Furthermore, ∆Vβ(0)(1, S) =
Vβ(0)(1, S) > 0, and thus by Lemma 2,
∆Vβ(0)(2, S − 1) = Vβ(0)(2, S − 1)− Vβ(0)(1, S − 1) = f∗0,β(0) − f∗∆V
β(0)
(1,S),β(0) > 0,
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since f∗
a,β(0)
is strictly decreasing in a.
Let c > 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L▹). Then (c, s) = (c, S − c). By the induction hypothesis we have
∆Vβ(0)(c, S − c+ 1) > 0, and thus
π∗β(0)(c, S − c) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(c, S − c+ 1)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) (14)
̸= arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
ph(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p) = π
∗
β(0)(c, S − c+ 1), (15)
where we used Lemma 2 for the first inequality, and (P.1) for the second equality. It remains to
show
∆Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c) = f∗0,β(0) − f∗∆V
β(0)
(c,S−c+1),β(0) > 0,
when c < C. Note that
Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(p−∆Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c+ 1)) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p)
+ Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c+ 1),
and
Vβ(0)(c, S − c) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(c, S − c+ 1)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(c, S − c+ 1).
Since (c+1, S−c+1) ∈ ▹ and (c, S−c+1) ∈ ▹, (P.1) implies Vβ(0)(c+1, S−c+1) = Vβ(0)(c, S−c+1).
In addition, c < C implies (c + 1, S − c) ∈ ▹, and thus ∆Vβ(0)(c + 1, S − c + 1) = 0 by (P.1). It
follows that
∆Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c) = Vβ(0)(c+ 1, S − c)− Vβ(0)(c, S − c) = f∗0,β(0) − f∗∆V
β(0)
(c,S−c+1),β(0) > 0,
where the strict positiveness follows by the induction hypothesis from the fact that ∆Vβ(0)(c, S −
c+ 1) > 0, together with the fact that f∗
a,β(0)
is strictly decreasing in a (Lemma 2(ii)).
This proves (P.2), and shows that a price-change occurs when ▹ is entered.
This concludes case 1.
Case 2. The path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S does not hit ▹. Then there is an s such that c(s) = 2 and
c(s+ 1) = 1. We show π∗
β(0)
(2, s) ̸= π∗
β(0)
(1, s+ 1), for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 2.
π∗β(0)(2, s) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p), (16)
π∗β(0)(1, s+ 1) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p). (17)
By Lemma 2, and the fact that π∗
β(0)
(2, s) and π∗
β(0)
(1, s + 1) are both contained in (pl, ph), it
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suffices to show ∆Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1) ̸= ∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2). We show by backward induction that
Vβ(0)(2, s)− Vβ(0)(1, s) ≤ Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)− ph(1− max
p∈[pl,ph]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 ph), (18)
for all 2 ≤ s ≤ S − 1. Since maxp∈[pl,ph] h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) < 1, this proves ∆Vβ(0)(2, s + 1) ̸=
∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2), and that in case 2 a price change occurs.
Let 2 ≤ s ≤ S − 1. Then
Vβ(0)(2, s) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1), (19)
Vβ(0)(1, s) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1), (20)
Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
(
p−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2). (21)
Using
Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1) ≥
[
(π∗β(0)(2, s)−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(2, s)) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
]
,
we have
Vβ(0)(2, s)− Vβ(0)(1, s)− Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)
≤(π∗β(0)(2, s)−∆Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(2, s)) + Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1)
−
[
(π∗β(0)(1, s)−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(1, s)) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)
]
−
[
(π∗β(0)(2, s)−∆Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2))h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(2, s)) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
]
=− π∗β(0)(1, s)h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(1, s))
+
[
Vβ(0)(2, s+ 1)− Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)− Vβ(0)(1, s+ 2)
][
1− h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 (π∗β(0)(2, s))
]
+Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 π
∗
β(0)(1, s))
≤− π∗β(0)(1, s)h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(1, s)) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π∗β(0)(1, s))
=Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)− Vβ(0)(1, s).
The last inequality is implied by Vβ(0)(2, s + 1) − Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) − Vβ(0)(1, s + 2) ≤ 0, which for
s = S − 1 follows from (P.1), and for s < S − 1 follows from the induction hypothesis.
The proof of Lemma 3 shows Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) = ∆Vβ(0)(1, s + 1) ≤ maxp∈[pl,ph] ph(β(0)0 + β(0)1 p) ≤
phmaxp∈[pl,ph] h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p). This implies
Vβ(0)(1, s) ≥ (ph − Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)) · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 ph) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)
≥ ph[1− max
p∈[pl,ph]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)] · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 ph) + Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1),
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and thus
Vβ(0)(2, s)− Vβ(0)(1, s)− Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1) ≤ Vβ(0)(1, s+ 1)− Vβ(0)(1, s)
≤ −ph[1− max
p∈[pl,ph]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)] · h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 ph),
i.e. equation (18). This concludes case 2.
We have shown that, on any path (c(s), s)1≤s≤S in X starting at (C, 1), the policy π∗β(0) induces
a price-change. It follows that there exists a v0 > 0 such that for all paths (c(s), s)1≤s≤S ,
|π∗β(0)(c(s), s)− π∗β(0)(c(s′), s′)| ≥ v0.
Remark 1. Equations (11) and (18) enable us to provide a lower bound on the price change v0.
Let β ∈ UB , a, a′ ∈ Ua, and a > a′, where Ua, UB are as in Lemma 1. A Taylor expansion of
ga,β(p) yields
ga,β(p
∗
a′,β) = ga,β(p
∗
a,β) +
∂ga,β
∂p
(p˜)(p∗a′,β − p∗a,β), (22)
for some p˜ between p∗a′,β and p
∗
a,β , and, for any p ∈ [pl, ph],
ga,β(p) = ga′,β(p) + β1
h˙(β0 + β1p)
h(β0 + β1p)
(a− a′).
In particular, choosing p = p∗a′,β ,
ga,β(p
∗
a′,β) = ga′,β(p
∗
a′,β) + β1
h˙(β0 + β1p
∗
a′,β)
h(β0 + β1p∗a′,β)
(a− a′), (23)
and thus, by combining (22) and (23) and using ga,β(p
∗
a,β) = ga′,β(p
∗
a′,β) = 1, we obtain
1− β1
h˙(β0 + β1p
∗
a′,β)
h(β0 + β1p∗a′,β)
(a′ − a) = 1 + ∂ga,β
∂p
(p˜)(p∗a′,β − p∗a,β),
which implies
∣∣∣∣p
∗
a′,β − p∗a,β
a′ − a
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−β1 h˙(β0+β1p
∗
a′,β
)
h(β0+β1p∗a′,β)
∂ga,β
∂p (p˜)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (24)
Thus, writing
C = min
β∈B
−β1minp∈[pl,ph] h˙(β0+β1p)h(β0+β1p)
maxp∈[pl,ph],a∈Ua
∣∣∣∂ga,β∂p (p)∣∣∣ ,
we have
|p∗a′,β − p∗a,β | ≥ C · |a′ − a|. (25)
25
Write x1,β = f
∗
0,β and define recursively
xc+1,β = x1,β − f∗xc,β ,β , 1 ≤ c ≤ C − 1.
Equation (11) implies
|π∗β(0)(c, s)− π∗β(0)(c, s+ 1)| ≥ C · xc,β(0)
for all (c, s) ∈ (L▹), and equation (18) implies
|π∗β(0)(2, s)− π∗β(0)(1, s+ 1)| ≥ C ·minβ∈B
∣∣ph(1− max
p∈[pl,ph]
h(β0 + β1p)) · h(β0 + β1ph)
∣∣
for 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 2. As a result, it follows that v0 satisfies
v0 ≥ C ·min
β∈B
min
{
x1,β , x2,β , . . . , xC,β ,
∣∣ph(1− max
p∈[pl,ph]
h(β0 + β1p)) · h(β0 + β1ph)
∣∣}. (26)
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the k-th selling season, for some arbitrary fixed k ∈ N. The prices generated by Φ(ϵ) are
based on the estimates βˆt, which are determined by the historical prices and demand realizations.
Now, different demand realizations can lead to the same state (c, s) of the MDP. For example, a
sale in the first period of a selling season and no sale in the second period leads to state (C−2, 3),
but this state is also reached if there is no sale in the first period and a sale in the second period
of the selling season. These two “routes” may lead to different estimates βˆt, and to different
pricing decisions in state (C − 2, 3). Thus, with Φ(ϵ), the prices in the k-th selling season are not
determined by a stationary policy for the Markov decision problem described in Section 2.3.
To be able to compare the optimal revenue in a selling season with that obtained by Φ(ϵ), we
define a new Markov decision problem, in which the states are sequences of demand realizations
in the selling season. Conditionally on all prices and demand realizations from before the start
of the selling season, Φ(ϵ) is then a stationary deterministic policy for this new MDP: each state
is associated with a unique price prescribed by Φ(ϵ). This enables us to calculate bounds on the
regret obtained in a single selling season.
We define this new MDP for any β ∈ B. The state space X˜ consists of all sequences of possible
demand realizations in the selling season:
X˜ = {(x1, . . . , xs) ∈ {0, 1}s | 0 ≤ s ≤ S},
where we denote the empty sequence by (∅). The action space is [pl, ph]. Using action p in state
(x1, . . . , xs), for 0 ≤ s < S, induces a state transition from (x1, . . . xs) to (x1, . . . , xs, 1) with proba-
bility h(β0+β1p) (corresponding to a sale, and inducing immediate reward ph(β0+β1p)1∑s
i=1 xi<C
),
and from (x1, . . . xs) to (x1, . . . , xs, 0) with probability 1− h(β0 + β1p) (corresponding to no sale,
and inducing zero reward). There are no state transitions in the terminal states (x1, . . . , xS) ∈ X˜ .
It is easily seen that the MDP described in section 2.3 is the same as the one described here,
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except that there states are aggregated: all states (x1, . . . , xs) and (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
s′) with s = s
′ and∑s
i=1 xi =
∑s′
i=1 x
′
i are there taken together.
Let π˜ = (π˜(x))x∈X˜ be a stationary deterministic policy for this MDP with augmented state space,
and let V˜ p˜iβ (x) be the corresponding value function, for β ∈ B. For x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ X˜ with s < S
we write (x; 1) = (x1, . . . , xs, 1) and (x; 0) = (x1, . . . , xs, 0). Then, for any x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ X˜
and β ∈ B, V˜ p˜iβ (x) satisfies the backward recursion
V˜ p˜iβ (x) = (π˜(x)1
∑
s
i=1 xi<C
+ V˜ p˜iβ (x; 1))h(β0 + β1π˜(x)) + V˜
p˜i
β (x; 0)(1− h(β0 + β1π˜(x))),
where we write V˜ p˜iβ (x; 1) = V˜
p˜i
β (x; 0) = 0 for all terminal states (x1, . . . , xS) ∈ X˜ .
Let π˜∗β be the optimal policy corresponding to β ∈ B, and write V˜β(x) = V˜
p˜i∗β
β (x). Then
V˜β(x) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
[
p1∑s
i=1 xi<C
− (V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1))]h(β0 + β1p) + V˜β(x; 0), (27)
π˜∗β(x) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
[
p1∑s
i=1 xi<C
− (V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1))]h(β0 + β1p). (28)
Using the same line of reasoning as Lemma 2 and 3, it can easily be shown that π˜∗β((x1, . . . , xs))
is unique if and only if
∑s
i=1 xi < C. For all x with
∑s
i=1 xi ≥ C, choose π˜∗β(x) = ph. In this way
π˜∗β(x) is uniquely defined for all x ∈ X˜ .
Let U and v0 be as in Theorem 1, ρ1 as in Proposition 1, and choose ρ ∈ (0, ρ1) such that β ∈ U
whenever ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ.
If (k − 1)S > Tρ, then βˆt ∈ U for all t = 1 + (k − 1)S, . . . , S(k − 1)S, and Theorem 1 implies
λmin(PkS) − λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥ 18v20(1 + p2h)−1. If (k − 1)S ≤ Tρ, then I) of the pricing strategy
Φ(ϵ) guarantees that there are 1 ≤ s, s′ ≤ S such that |ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S | ≥ ϵ. By Lemma
4 this implies λmin(PkS) − λmin(P(k−1)S) ≥ 12ϵ2(1 + p2h)−1. Since ϵ2 ≤ v20/4, this means that
λmin(PkS) ≥ k · 12ϵ2(1 + p2h)−1 for all k ∈ N, and thus for all t > S,
λmin(Pt) ≥ λmin(P(SSt−1)S) ≥ (SSt − 1) ·
1
2
ϵ2(1 + p2h)
−1 ≥ t · 1
4S
ϵ2(1 + p2h)
−1,
using SSt − 1 ≥ t (SSt−1)S·SSt ≥ t2S . (Recall the definition SSt = 1 + ⌊(t − 1)/S⌋). By application of
Proposition 1 with t0 = S and L(t) = t · 14S ϵ2(1 + p2h)−1, we have Tρ < ∞ a.s., E[Tρ] < ∞, and
E[||βˆt − β(0)||21t>Tρ ] = O (log(t)/t).
In addition, v0/2 > ϵ implies that I) of the pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) does not occur for all t with
(SSt − 1)S > Tρ. In particular, if (k − 1)S > Tρ, then
p1+s+(k−1)S = π˜
∗
βˆs+(k−1)S
(d1+(k−1)S , d2+(k−1)S , . . . , ds+(k−1)S), (29)
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 1, and
p1+(k−1)S = π˜
∗
βˆ(k−1)S
(∅). (30)
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Let H = (p1, . . . , p(k−1)S , d1, . . . , d(k−1)S) denote the history of prices and demand up to and
including time period (k− 1)S. Conditionally on H, and given that (k− 1)S > Tρ, the parameter
estimates βˆs+(k−1)S in (29) and (30) are completely determined by the state
(d1+(k−1)S , d2+(k−1)S , . . . , ds+(k−1)S). Thus, for each state x ∈ X˜ there is a uniquely associated
price prescribed by Φ(ϵ). Consequently, there is a stationary deterministic policy, denoted by π˜H ,
such that
p1+s+(k−1)S = π˜
H(x), when x = (d1+(k−1)S , d2+(k−1)S , . . . , ds+(k−1)S), 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 1,
p1+(k−1)S = π˜
H(∅).
This enables us to bound the regret in the k-th selling season:
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
E[pimin{di, ci}]
=E



V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pimin{di, ci}

1(k−1)S≤Tρ


+E



V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pimin{di, ci}

1(k−1)S>Tρ


≤V˜β(0)(∅)P ((k − 1)S ≤ Tρ)
+E

E



V˜β(0)(∅)− kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
pimin{di, ci}

1(k−1)S>Tρ | H




≤V˜β(0)(∅)
E[Tρ]
(k − 1)S (31)
+E
[
E
[(
V˜β(0)(∅)− V˜ p˜i
H
β(0)(∅)
)
1(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
. (32)
The term (31) is finite because E[Tρ] <∞. To obtain an upper bound on the term (32), we need
a number of sensitivity results:
(S.0) For all β ∈ UB and x such that (x; 0), (x; 1) ∈ X˜ , we have
0 ≤ V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) ≤ max
p∈[pl,ph]
p · h(β0 + β1p). (33)
(S.1) Write Ys = (d1+(k−1)S , . . . , ds+(k−1)S) for 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 1, and Y0 = (∅). There is a K0 > 0
such that, for all stationary deterministic policies π˜ and all 0 ≤ s ≤ S − 1,
(V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys))1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0
S−1∑
σ=s
(π˜∗β(0)(Yσ)− π˜(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ a.s. (34)
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(S.2) There is a K3 > 0 such that for all β ∈ B with ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ, and all x ∈ X˜ ,
|π˜∗β(x)− π˜∗β(0)(x)| ≤ K3||β − β(0)||. (35)
The proof of these three sensitivity properties is given below.
Application of (S.1), (S.2), and Proposition 1 now gives
E
[
E
[(
V˜β(0)(∅)− V˜ p˜i
H
β(0)(∅)
)
1(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
≤E
[
E
[
K0
S−1∑
σ=0
(π˜∗β(0)(Yσ)− π˜H(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ | H
]]
=E
[
K0
S−1∑
σ=0
(π˜∗β(0)(Yσ)− π˜∗βˆσ+(k−1)S (Yσ))
21(k−1)S>Tρ
]
≤E
[
K0K
2
3
S−1∑
σ=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣β(0) − βˆσ+(k−1)S∣∣∣∣∣∣2 1(k−1)S>Tρ
]
≤K4
S−1∑
σ=0
log(σ + (k − 1)S)
σ + (k − 1)S ,
for some K4 independent of k and S.
We then have
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
E[pimin{di, ci}]
≤V˜β(0)(∅)E[Tρ]
1
(k − 1)S +K4
S−1∑
σ=0
log(σ + (k − 1)S)
σ + (k − 1)S
≤K5
kS∑
t=1+(k−1)S
log(t)
t
,
for some K5 > 0, independent of k and S.
The proof of the theorem is complete by observing
Regret(Φ(ϵ), T ) =
T∑
k=1
[
Vβ(0)(C, 1)−
kS∑
i=1+(k−1)S
E[pimin{di, ci}]
]
≤
T∑
k=1
K5
kS∑
t=1+(k−1)S
log(t)
t
= K5
TS∑
t=1
log(t)
t
= O(log2(T )).
Proof of (S.0)
We prove the assertion for all (x1, . . . , xs−1) ∈ X˜ , s = 1, . . . , S, by backward induction on s. If
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x = (x1, . . . , xS−1) ∈ X˜ then V˜β(x; 0) = V˜β(x; 1) = 0.
Let x ∈ X . If ∑si=1 xi ≥ C then V˜β(x; 0) − V˜β(x; 1) = 0. If ∑si=1 xi < C then the induction
hypothesis implies
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
=
[
π∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
π∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
≥
[
π∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 1)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
π∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
=
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)
(1− h(β0 + β1π∗β(x; 1)))
+
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 1))
≥ 0,
and
V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1)
=
[
π∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
π∗β(x; 1)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 1))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
≤
[
π∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 0)) + V˜β(x; 0; 0)
−
[
π∗β(x; 0)−
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)]
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 0))− V˜β(x; 1; 0)
=
(
V˜β(x; 0; 0)− V˜β(x; 0; 1)
)
(1− h(β0 + β1π∗β(x; 0)))
+
(
V˜β(x; 1; 0)− V˜β(x; 1; 1)
)
h(β0 + β1π
∗
β(x; 0))
≤ max
p∈[pl,ph]
p · h(β0 + β1p).
Proof of (S.1)
Backward induction on s. If s = S − 1 then Lemma 2(iii) implies
V˜β(0)(YS−1)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(YS−1)
= max
p∈[pl,ph]
p1∑S−1
i=1 Yi<C
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)− π˜(YS−1)1∑S−1
i=1 Yi<C
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 π˜(YS−1))
≤K0(π˜∗β(0)(Ys)− π˜(YS−1))2 a.s.,
and thus
(V˜β(0)(YS−1)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(YS−1)) · 1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0(π˜∗β(0)(Ys)− π˜(YS−1))2 · 1(k−1)S>Tρ a.s.
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If 0 ≤ s < S − 1, then
V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys)
= max
p∈[pl,ph]
[
p1∑s
i=1 Yi<C
− (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 p)
−[π˜(Ys)1∑s
i=1 Yi<C
− (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 π˜(Ys))
+
[
π˜(Ys)1∑s
i=1 Yi<C
− (V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 π˜(Ys))
−[π˜(Ys)1∑s
i=1 Yi<C
− (V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 1))
]
h(β
(0)
0 + β
(0)
1 π˜(Ys))
+V˜ (Ys; 0)− V˜ p˜i(Ys; 0)
≤K0(π˜∗β(0)(Ys)− π˜(Ys))2
+
(
V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 0)
) · (1− h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π˜(Ys)))
+
(
V˜β(0)(Ys; 1)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys; 1)
) · (h(β(0)0 + β(0)1 π˜(Ys))
=K0(π˜
∗
β(0)(Ys)− π˜(Ys))2 +
[
V˜β(0)(Ys+1)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys+1)
]
a.s.
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 2(iii), observing that (S.0) implies
V˜β(0)(Ys; 0)− V˜β(0)(Ys; 1) ∈ Ua. The induction hypothesis now implies
(V˜β(0)(Ys)− V˜ p˜iβ(0)(Ys))1(k−1)S>Tρ ≤ K0
S−1∑
σ=s
(π˜∗β(0)(Yσ)− π˜(Yσ))21(k−1)S>Tρ a.s.
Proof of (S.2)
If
∑s
i=1 xi ≥ C then π˜∗β(x)− π˜∗β(0)(x) = ph − ph = 0. If
∑s
i=1 xi < C, then
π˜∗β(x)− π˜∗β(0)(x) = p∗V˜β(x;0)−V˜β(x;1),β − p
∗
V˜
β(0)
(x;0)−V˜
β(0)
(x;1),β(0)
= p∗a,β − p∗a(0),β(0) , (36)
in the notation of Lemma 2, with a = V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) and a(0) = V˜β(0)(x; 0)− V˜β(0)(x; 1).
By (S.0) we have a, a(0) ∈ Ua and β ∈ UB , and thus by Lemma 2, π˜∗β(x) is continuously differ-
entiable. The set {β ∈ B | ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ} is compact, and so is the set {V˜β(x; 0) − V˜β(x; 1) |
||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ, β ∈ B}. As a result, the derivative of p∗a,β w.r.t. (a, β) is bounded on the set
(a, β) ∈ {V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(x; 1) | ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ, β ∈ B} × {β ∈ B | ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ}. It follows by a
first-order Taylor expansion that there is a K6 > 0 such that for all such (a, β),
|p∗a,β − p∗a(0),β(0) | ≤ K6(|a− a(0)|+ ||β − β(0)||). (37)
It is not difficult to show by backward induction that for all x ∈ X˜ there is a Kx > 0 such that,
for all β with ||β − β(0)|| ≤ ρ,
∣∣∣V˜β(x)− V˜β(0)(x)∣∣∣ ≤ Kx ∣∣∣∣∣∣β − β(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (38)
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Combining (36), (37), and (38), we obtain
|π˜∗β(x)− π˜∗β(0)(x)|
≤K6(|a− a(0)|+ ||β − β(0)||)
≤K6(|V˜β(x; 0)− V˜β(0)(x; 0)|+ |V˜β(x; 1)− V˜β(0)(x; 1)|+ ||β − β(0)||)
≤K6(1 + 2max
x∈X˜
Kx)||β − β(0)||.
This proves (S.2).
Proof of Theorem 3
Let ψ be a pricing strategy, and define B′ = [5/8, 6/8] × {−10/16}. For β ∈ B′, let ψβ be the
pricing strategy that coincides with ψ if t mod S = 1, and that equals the optimal price π∗β(ct, st)
if t mod S ̸= 1; we thus replace the pricing decisions in the second time periods of each selling
season by the optimal price w.r.t. β. For T = 1 the statement of the theorem is trivial; let T ≥ 2.
By the principle of optimality we have
sup
β∈B
Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ sup
β∈B′
Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ sup
β∈B′
Regret(ψβ , T )
= sup
β∈B′
T∑
i=1
E
[
[π∗β(1, 1)−∆Vβ(1, 2)](β0 + β1π∗β(1, 1))
−[p1+2(i−1) −∆Vβ(1, 2)](β0 + β1p1+2(i−1))
]
, (39)
since the regret of ψβ is determined by the pricing decisions in the first periods of selling seasons,
p1+2(i−1), i = 1, . . . , T .
For all β ∈ B′, we have
∆Vβ(1, 2) = Vβ(1, 2) = max
p∈[pl,ph]
p(β0 + β1p) =
β20
−4β1 ,
π∗β(1, 1) = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
[p−∆Vβ(1, 2)](β0 + β1p) = β0−2β1 +
1
2
β20
−4β1 ,
and
[π∗β(1, 1)−∆Vβ(1, 2)](β0 + β1π∗β(1, 1))− [p1+2(i−1) −∆Vβ(1, 2)](β0 + β1p1+2(i−1))
=− β1(p1+2(i−1) − π∗β(1, 1))2,
and thus
sup
β∈B
Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ sup
β∈B′
10
16
T∑
i=1
E[(p1+2(i−1) − π∗β(1, 1))2].
We proceed by showing that E[(p1+2(i−1)−π∗β(1, 1))2] ≥ 1ai+b , for some a, b > 0 and all 2 ≤ i ≤ T .
This inequality follows from a generalization of the van Trees inequality, derived in Gill and Levit
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(1995, equation (4)). Similar approaches to derive regret lower bounds are found in Goldenshluger
and Zeevi (2009), Harrison et al. (2011), and Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012). Our proof
closely follows the proof of Lemma 4.6 in the e-companion to Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012).
Fix 2 ≤ i ≤ T . define the sample space D(i−1)S = {0, 1}(i−1)S , let D(i−1)S = (d1, . . . , d(i−1)S) ∈
D(i−1)S be the random variable denoting the demand in periods 1 to (i− 1)S, and write d(i−1)S
for a realization of D(i−1)S . Define the family of distributions {Qβ0 | β ∈ [β′0 − δ, β′0 + δ]}, where
Qβ0(d(i−1)S) =
(i−1)S∏
t=1
(β0 + β1pt)
dt(1− (β0 + β1pt))1−dt , d(i−1)S ∈ D(i−1)S ,
is the distribution of demand realizations in time periods 1 to (i− 1)S.
Let λ0(θ) = cos
2(πθ/2)1|θ|≤1, define the density λ on [5/8, 6/8] as
λ(β0) =
1
1/8
λ0
(
β0 − 11/16
(1/8)
)
, β0 ∈ [5/8, 6/8],
cf. Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2009, page 1632), and let Z be a random variable supported on
[5/8, 6/8] with density λ.
Then by the van Trees inequality, we have
E[(p1+2(i−1) − π∗β(1, 1))2] ≥
(E[ ∂∂β0π
∗
β(1, 1)])
2
E[( ∂∂β0 logQ
β0(D(i−1)S))2] + E[(
∂
∂β0
log λ(β0))2]
,
where the expectations are with respect to the joint distribution of Qβ0 and λ.
Now
E
[
(
∂
∂β0
logQβ0(D(i−1)S))
2 | D(i−1)S−1 = d(i−1)S−1
]
(40)
=
2
(β0 + β1p2(i−1))(1− (β0 + β1p2(i−1)))
(41)
≤ sup
p∈P,β∈B
2
(β0 + β1p)(1− (β0 + β1p)) (42)
=
2
(13/136) · (1− 15/32) =
8704
221
< 40, (43)
and by applying the chain rule for Fisher information (Lemma EC.5.2 of the e-companion of
Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012)), it follows that
E
[
(
∂
∂β0
logQβ0(D(i−1)S))
2
]
≤ 40(i− 1)S < 80i. (44)
We furthermore have E[( ∂∂β0 log λ(β0))
2] = π2/(1/8)2 and (E[ ∂∂β0π
∗
β(1, 1)])
2 = (43/40)2, and thus
E[(p1+2(i−1) − π∗β(1, 1))2] ≥
(43/40)2
80i+ 64π2
.
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This implies
sup
β∈B
Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ 10
16
T∑
i=2
(43/40)2
80i+ 64π2
≥ 10
16
432
402
1
80 + 64π2
T∑
i=2
1
i
≥ 10
16
432
402
1
80 + 64π2
1
2
log(T ).
9 Appendix: Auxiliary Lemmas
In this section we formulate and prove several auxiliary results that are used in the proofs of the
main theorems of the paper.
Lemma 1 shows that the assumptions we impose on ga,β(p) do not only hold for a ∈ [0, r∗] and
β = β(0), but also on an open neighborhood around [0, r∗] × {β(0)}. This result enables us in
later proofs to apply the implicit function theorem. Lemma 2 considers the optimization problem
underlying (3), and shows uniqueness, differentiability, and sensitivity properties. These results
are applied in Lemma 3 to conclude that (π∗β)1≤c≤C,1≤s≤S is uniquely defined and continuous in β,
on an open neighborhood around β(0). Lemma 4 relates price differences to the growth of λmin(Pt)
during a selling season.
Lemma 1. There are open sets Ua ⊂ R containing [0, r∗], and UB ⊂ B containing β(0), with
sup
β∈UB
max
p∈[pl,ph]
p · h(β0 + β1p) ∈ Ua, (45)
and such that
ga,β(pl) < 1, ga,β(ph) > 1 and ga,β(p) strictly increasing in p, (46)
holds for all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB.
Lemma 2. Let Ua and UB be as in Lemma 1, and for all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB define the function
fa,β(p) = (p − a)h(β0 + β1p). Write f˙a,β(p) and f¨a,β(p) for the first and second derivative of
fa,β(p) with respect to p, and let p
∗
a,β = arg max
p∈[pl,ph]
fa,β(p). Then:
(i) p∗a,β is the unique solution to f˙a,β(p) = 0, lies in (pl, ph), and in addition satisfies f¨a,β(p
∗
a,β) <
0.
(ii) p∗a,β is continuously differentiable in a and β, strictly increasing in a, and fa,β(p
∗
a,β) is strictly
decreasing in a.
(iii) There is a K0 > 0 such that for all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB and p ∈ [pl, ph],
fa,β(p
∗
a,β)− fa,β(p) ≤ K0(p− p∗a,β)2.
Lemma 3. Let UB be as in Lemma 1. For each β ∈ UB and (c, s) ∈ X with c > 0 we have
∆Vβ(c, s) ∈ Ua. Furthermore, π∗β(c, s) is uniquely defined and continuous in β.
Lemma 4. Let k ∈ N. If there are s, s′ ∈ {1, . . . , S} such that |ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S | ≥ δ, then
λmin(PkS) ≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) + 12δ2(1 + p2h)−1.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The lemma follows directly from the continuity assumptions on h.
Proof of Lemma 2
Since
f˙a,β(p) = h(β0 + β1p)
[
1 + (p− a)β1 h˙(β0 + β1p)
h(β0 + β1p)
]
= h(β0 + β1p) [1− ga,β(p)] ,
and h(β0 + β1p) > 0 for all β ∈ UB , p ∈ [pl, ph], we have f˙a,β(p) = 0 if and only if ga,β(p) = 1. By
Lemma 1, for all (a, β) ∈ Ua ×UB there is a unique p∗a,β ∈ (pl, ph) such that ga,β(p∗a,β) = 1. From
f¨a,β(p) =
∂
∂p
[
h(β0 + β1p)(1− ga,β(p))
]
= β1h˙(β0 + β1p)(1− ga,β(p))− h(β0 + β1p) ∂
∂p
ga,β(p)
follows
f¨a,β(p
∗
a,β) = −h(β0 + β1p∗a,β)
∂
∂p
ga,β(p
∗
a,β) < 0,
since by Lemma 1, ga,β is strictly increasing in p. This proves (i).
For all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB , p∗a,β is the unique solution in (pl, ph) to ga,β(p)− 1 = 0, and
∂ga,β(p)
∂p
∣∣∣
p=p∗
a,β
> 0.
The implicit function theorem (see e.g. Duistermaat and Kolk, 2004) then implies that p∗a,β is
continuously differentiable at every (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB .
Furthermore, for all (a, β) ∈ Ua × UB and p ∈ [pl, ph] we have
∂ga,β(p)
∂a
= β1
h˙(β0 + β1p)
h(β0 + β1p)
< 0.
This implies that for all a ∈ Ua, a′ ∈ Ua, with a < a′, and all p ∈ [pl, ph] with p ≤ p∗a,β , we have
ga′,β(p) ≤ ga,β(p) ≤ 1. Therefore p∗a′,β > p∗a,β for all a < a′, and thus p∗a,β is strictly monotone
increasing in a.
Using ga,β(p
∗
a,β) = 1 and thus (p
∗
a,β − a) = (−β−11 )
h(β0+β1p
∗
a,β)
h˙(β0+β1p∗a,β)
, we have
fa,β(p
∗
a,β) = (p
∗
a,β − a)h(β0 + β1p∗a,β) = (−β−11 )
h(β0 + β1p
∗
a,β)
2
h˙(β0 + β1p∗a,β)
,
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and thus
∂
∂a
fa,β(p
∗
a,β)) = (−β−11 )

 ∂
∂z
h(z)2
h˙(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=β0+β1p∗a,β

β1 ∂
∂a
p∗a,β . (47)
Log-concavity of h implies ∂
2 log(h(z))
∂z2 =
h(z)h¨(z)−h˙(z)2
h(z)2 ≤ 0, and thus
∂
∂z
h(z)2
h˙(z)
=
2h(z)h˙(z)2 − h(z)2h¨(z)
h˙(z)2
= h(z)
[
2− h(z)h¨(z)
h(z)2
h(z)2
h˙(z)2
]
≥ h(z)
[
2− h˙(z)
2
h(z)2
h(z)2
h˙(z)2
]
= h(z).
Since ∂∂ap
∗
a,β > 0, it follows that fa,β(p
∗
a,β) is strictly decreasing in a. This completes the proof of
(ii).
Let K0 = sup(a,β,p)∈Ua×UB×[pl,ph]−f¨a,β(p)/2. Since (a, β, p) 7→ fa,β(p) is twice continuously
differentiable on R × B × [pl, ph] and f¨a,β(p∗a,β) < 0, it follows that 0 < K0 < ∞. By a Taylor
expansion, there is a p˜a,β on the line segment between p and p
∗
a,β , such that
fa,β(p) = fa,β(p
∗
a,β) + f˙a,β(p
∗
a,β)(p− p∗a,β) +
1
2
f¨a,β(p˜a,β)(p− p∗a,β)2
≥ fa,β(p∗a,β)−K0(p− p∗a,β)2,
using f˙a,β(p
∗
a,β) = 0. This proves (iii).
Proof of Lemma 3
Let β ∈ UB . We show 0 ≤ ∆Vβ(c, s) ≤ maxp∈[pl,ph] ph(β0 + β1p), for all (c, s) ∈ X . By (45), this
implies ∆Vβ(c, s) ∈ Ua. In view of (3), uniqueness and continuity of π∗β then follow from repeated
application of Lemma 2(i, ii), for each (c, s) ∈ X .
If s = S then ∆Vβ(c, S) = 0 for c > 1 or c = 0, and Vβ(1, S) = maxp∈[pl,ph] ph(β0+β1p). If s < S,
then by backward induction,
∆Vβ(c, s) = (π
∗
β(c, s)−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s)) + Vβ(c, s+ 1)
− (π∗β(c− 1, s)−∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s))− Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1)
≥ (π∗β(c− 1, s)−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s)) + Vβ(c, s+ 1)
− (π∗β(c− 1, s)−∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s))− Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1)
= ∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))(1− h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s)))
+ ∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s))
≥ 0,
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and
∆Vβ(c, s) = (π
∗
β(c, s)−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s)) + Vβ(c, s+ 1)
− (π∗β(c− 1, s)−∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c− 1, s))− Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1)
≤ (π∗β(c, s)−∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s)) + Vβ(c, s+ 1)
− (π∗β(c, s)−∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s))− Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1)
= ∆Vβ(c, s+ 1))(1− h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s)))
+ ∆Vβ(c− 1, s+ 1))h(β0 + β1π∗β(c, s))
≤ max
p∈[pl,ph]
ph(β0 + β1p).
Proof of Lemma 4
For any 2×2 positive definite matrix A with eigenvalues 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2, we have λ2 ≤ λ1+λ2 = tr(A),
det(A) = λ1λ2, and consequentially λ1 = det(A)/λ2 ≥ det(A)/tr(A). For a, b ≤ ph we thus have
λmin
(
2 a+ b
a+ b a2 + b2
)
≥ 2a
2 + 2b2 − (a+ b)2
2 + a2 + b2
≥ (a− b)
2
2(1 + p2h)
.
Since λmin(Pt) ≥ λmin(Pr) + λmin(Pr′) for all r, r′, t ∈ N with r + r′ = t (Bhatia, 1997, Corollary
III.2.2, page 63), we have
λmin(PkS) ≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) + λmin

 ∑
1≤i≤S,i/∈{s,s′}
(
1
pi+(k−1)S
)
(1, pi+(k−1)S)


+ λmin
((
1
ps+(k−1)S
)
(1, ps+(k−1)S) +
(
1
ps′+(k−1)S
)
(1, ps′+(k−1)S)
)
≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) +
(ps+(k−1)S − ps′+(k−1)S)2
2(1 + p2h)
≥ λmin(P(k−1)S) + δ
2
2(1 + p2h)
.
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